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Abstract 
This study examines how the interplay between racial diversity and economic inequality affects 
variations of social capital in the U.S. counties. In general, racial and economic heterogeneity is 
assumed to provide a negative environment for the growth of social capital. Building on this, we 
argue the effect of economic inequality is weaker than that of racial diversity because increased 
economic heterogeneity is felt less visibly and acutely than racial heterogeneity. Moreover, 
economic inequality can positively condition the adverse impact of racial diversity on social 
capital when the two interact. Based on the crosscutting cleavages theory, income inequality in a 
racially fragmented community works as an additional cleavage that crosscuts the different racial 
groups, mitigating the negative impact of racial diversity on social capital. The data analysis of 
3,140 U.S. counties in 2009-2014 provides strong evidence for our arguments. Our findings offer 
important implications in understanding inequality, race and American democracy. 
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Understanding the dynamics of social capital is critical to a wide spectrum of theories on 
the quality of democracy and economic development. Within extant research, social capital, 
whose core value resides in extensive trustworthiness and interpersonal trust, is shown to 
increase government responsiveness, productivity, efficiency, and even the psychological well-
being of individuals (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 2001; Kawachi, Kennedy, & Glass, 1999; 
Knack, 2002; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1995, 2001). Although myriad studies examine 
the “social capital hypothesis”—the positive externalities of social capital, relatively fewer 
scholarly inquiries have been made on what promotes or depresses social capital. Based on the 
insights from the existing studies that examine social capital as a dependent variable, one can 
note that racial diversity and income inequality have received the most attention from 
researchers. In the context of the U.S., for instance, both factors have been proven to negatively 
affect social capital (Hero, 2003; Hero & Tolbert, 1996; Putnam, 2007; Stolle, Soroka, & 
Johnston, 2008; Uslaner, 2004; Uslaner & Brown, 2005). 
Although these prior studies provide insightful findings on the relationships between 
racial/economic heterogeneity and social capital, they have largely ignored three important 
aspects. First, they are not quite clear about specific mechanisms of how racial diversity and 
income inequality affect social capital. For instance, we do not know much about whether the 
two factors depress social capital with the same magnitude and if not, which of the two has a 
more prevailing effect. Moreover, how these factors interact and affect social capital when 
combined together remains largely unknown in the literature. Second, the existing studies do not 
offer much in regards to how racial and economic heterogeneity affects different types of social 
capital—bonding and bridging. Researchers have raised the importance of differentiating these 
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two types of social capital, but there have not been many empirical attempts successfully made to 
address this issue (see Putnam, 2001). 
Third, the level of analysis often remains at aggregate levels such as the national, the 
state or provincial level or at the individual level. Mid-level analyses such as communities, cities, 
and counties are relatively rare and the existing studies are limited to select samples of cities or 
neighborhoods (Coffé & Geys, 2006; Letki, 2008; Marschall & Stolle, 2004; Oliver & Wong, 
2003). Given that social capital concerns a face-to-face interaction and engagement in a 
“community,” the lack of mid-level analyses in the research of social capital is surprising. In this 
article, we attempt to fill these intellectual gaps by investigating how the interplay between racial 
diversity and income inequality affects variations of social capital, focusing on the U.S. counties. 
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it aims to clarify the theoretical mechanisms 
of how racial diversity and income inequality affect social capital, first exogenously and second 
interactively. Based on the recent studies that show many people do not correctly perceive the 
cue of economic inequality (Chambers, Swan, & Heesacker, 2014; Gimpelson & Treisman, 
2018), we argue that the negative effect of income inequality on social capital should be weaker 
than that of racial diversity. Moreover, drawing from the “crosscutting cleavages theory” (Dahl, 
1956; Lipset, 1960; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Powell, 1976), we assert that income inequality can 
positively condition the impact of racial diversity on social capital when the two interact. Also, 
by tapping into different types of social capital, namely bonding and bridging social capital, we 
examine how racial diversity and income inequality affect social capital differentially or 
similarly. 
Second, this article attempts to subject our theoretical expectations to rigorous empirical 
tests that are conducted at the U.S. county level. Although racial diversity and income inequality 
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have received ample scholarly attention, only a few studies have empirically tested both together 
in their analyses and even fewer have explored their interaction effects (e.g., Alesina & La 
Ferrara, 2000; Leigh, 2006; Paarlberg, Hoyman, & McCall, 2018; Rupasingha, Goetz, & 
Freshwater, 2006). In addition, unlike many other studies conducted at state- or country-levels, 
or individual levels, this article sheds light on the effect of racial diversity and income inequality 
on social capital at a mid-level, focusing on U.S. counties. By examining 3,140 U.S. counties in 
2009-2014, this study contributes to the literature by clarifying the multifaceted relationships 
between racial/economic heterogeneity and social capital and providing rigorous empirical 
analysis in the comprehensive cross-sectional time-series setting. 
 
Social Capital and the “Homophily” Principle 
To define social capital is a challenging task due to the diverse perspectives and lack of 
consensual theoretical framework in the literature (Sobel, 2002). According to Coleman (1988) 
and Bourdieu (1986), social capital is an inherently unobservable asset that accrues on the 
network of relationships among individuals. This asset is labeled “social capital” as individuals 
through engaging with others can utilize it and enjoy tangible benefits out of it. For example, 
individuals with extensive associations have wider access to information and are likely to have 
more support networks than those who do not bond with others. Putnam (1995) clarifies the 
concept by defining it as “networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives” (pp. 664-665). 
Many scholars view social capital as an invaluable social asset as they believe it creates a 
number of positive externalities. For instance, some scholars contend that social capital promotes 
economic development by reducing transaction costs and promoting trust and civic cooperation 
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(Fukuyama, 2001; Knack & Keefer, 1997). In the political realm, most notably Putnam (1993, 
1995) argues that social capital improves government performance, cultivates public-spirited 
citizenry, and thus makes democracy work. Numerous studies test and reaffirm the positive 
relationship between social capital and democracy cross-nationally (Boix & Posner, 1998; Keele, 
2007; Krishna, 2002; Newton, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Seligson, 1999). 
However, there is a caveat to this “social capital hypothesis.” Some studies uncover the 
dark side of social capital and question the belief that social capital is the elixir to cure all social 
ills. For example, Putzel (1997) argues that social capital might be a contributing factor for 
economic development, but its utility for democracy is questionable. Uribe (2014) further asserts 
that networks of trust facilitate corruption. In the context of the U.S., Hero (2003, 2007) and 
Hawes and Rocha (2011) find inverse relations between social capital and policy equity between 
white and African American populations. Relatedly, Hawes (2017) finds that social capital 
encourages punitive attitudes toward racial minorities, resulting in increased incarcerations for 
African Americans. In their study of the rise of Nazi Party in Germany,  Satyanath, Voigtlander, 
and Voth (2017) confirm that higher associational density in towns was positively associated 
with faster Nazi Party entry. 
Despite these critiques, social capital is still viewed more as a desirable asset than as an 
evil one. Due to its wide utility and implications, researchers of various fields have extensively 
explored the effects of social capital. Relatively speaking, however, less scholarly attention has 
been paid to what accounts for the formation of social capital with a few exceptions (e.g., Brehm 
& Rahn, 1997; Freitag, 2006; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Valdivieso & Villena-Roldan, 2014). 
The prevailing assumption in the literature can be summarized in the “homophily principle.” It 
stipulates that “people prefer to interact with others who share the same ethnic heritage, have the 
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same social status and hence share experiences and tastes” (Tolsma, Van der Meer, & 
Gesthuizen, 2009: 287). According to the homophily principle, social homogeneity encourages a 
notion of a shared fate among individuals and thus provides a favorable environment for the 
growth of social capital. 
In understanding the impact of social homogeneity on social capital, the extant literature 
guides us to focus on two important factors: racial diversity and income inequality. First, racial 
diversity is known to be adverse to social capital. Putnam (2001, 2007) argues that high racial 
diversity, specifically immigration, leads people to distrust others and this occurs not only 
toward those of other racial/ethnic backgrounds, but also of the same race. According to him, 
racial diversity reduces solidarity, causes people to “hunker down,” and reduces their interactions 
with each other. The negative relationship between racial heterogeneity and social capital enjoys 
solid empirical support in the literature (e.g., Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2010; Gesthuizen, Van der 
Meer, & Scheepers, 2009; Hero, 2003; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Letki, 2008; Stolle et al., 2008; 
Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Kuha, & Jackson, 2014, to name a few). Following this dominant view, 
we believe that racial diversity lowers social capital in U.S. counties. The effect of racial 
diversity is direct and visible in the local setting. An increase in racial diversity can easily be 
detected by inhabitants, and it can give rise to a heightened level of heterogeneity and 
multicultural diversity. The feeling of distinctness and foreignness can, in turn, erode solidarity, 
and ultimately, social capital.  
Similar to the effect of racial diversity, the existing research suggests that income 
inequality weakens social bonds in general. A considerable gap among different income strata 
makes it hard for the sense of shared fate to grow, which hinders the growth of social capital. 
Many studies find evidence that supports the negative relationship between income inequality 
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and social capital, and its unfavorable consequences (Kawachi et al., 1997; Siahpush et al., 2006; 
Uslaner, 2004; Uslaner & Brown, 2005, Wright, 2015). However, it does not enjoy unanimous 
empirical support the way that racial diversity’s impact upon social capital does. A few studies 
find weak or no relationships between income heterogeneity and social capital at all. For 
instance, Rupasingha et al. (2006) find that income inequality lowered social capital in U.S. 
counties between 1990 and 1997, but not during the 1980-1990 period. Fairbrother and Martin 
(2013) confirm that income inequality explains the variation of social capital across the U.S. 
states, but fail to find evidence for its longitudinal variation. Further, they do not find any 
significant relationship between income inequality and social capital at the county level. 
 
Connecting Racial Diversity and Income Inequality 
Then, how does the interplay between racial diversity and economic inequality affect 
variations of social capital in the U.S. counties? Considering both, which one has a larger effect 
on a stock of social capital? How does the interaction of the two affect social capital? In this 
section, we develop theoretical expectations to address these questions. 
First, unlike prior studies that treat income inequality and racial diversity the same as if 
they had an equally negative impact on social capital (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Leigh, 2006; 
Rupasingha et al., 2006), we argue that the impact of income inequality is weaker than that of 
racial diversity. Increased income inequality and the sense of heterogeneity generated by it are 
less visible and perceivable than increased racial diversity in general. Supporting this point, 
recent studies show that many people do not correctly perceive the cue of economic inequality 
(Chambers et al., 2014; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018). For instance, Norton and Ariely (2011) 
claim that Americans tend to feel the U.S. is more egalitarian than it actually is. Also, opinion 
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polls and statistics suggest most Americans believe they are middle class and this pattern is 
consistent over time despite rapidly increasing inequality in the country during the past decades 
(Pew Research, 2015). In other words, these studies suggest that there are discrepancies between 
actual and perceived income inequality. We believe this explains the weaker empirical support 
regarding the relationship between income inequality and social capital in the literature to some 
extent. 
In contrast, the visual cue of increased racial diversity is less ambiguous. For instance, 
according to the racial threat literature, the size of minority groups that are physically present in 
a community is known to be the primary factor that activates racial consciousness and forms 
certain racial attitudes. For this reason, we believe that the magnitude of heterogeneity generated 
by income inequality can be less prominent than that by racial diversity and thus, the former 
erodes social capital less strongly than does the latter. 
 
H1: The negative effect of income inequality on social capital is weaker than that of 
racial diversity in U.S. counties. 
 
Second, we believe that the types of social capital—bonding and bridging—that are 
affected by racial diversity and income inequality are different as well. Previous research suggest 
that it is important to consider bonding and bridging social capital separately in order to 
understand the nature of social capital accurately (Coffé & Greys, 2007; Knack, 2003; Patulny & 
Svendsen, 2007; Putnam, 2001; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Despite our conviction that racial 
diversity significantly undermines the stock of social capital, we acknowledge that there could be 
another possibility as suggested by the racial threat hypothesis. The racial threat hypothesis 
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suggests a dominant racial group becomes more hostile as the size of minority groups increases 
(Oliver & Wong, 2003). As racial diversity increases in a neighborhood, more individuals of the 
majority group feel their existing privilege is threatened and this leads them to become race-
conscious and develop punitive policy attitudes towards out-groups (Blalock, 1967; Giles & 
Buckner, 1993; Key, 1949; Tolbert & Grummel, 2003). In other words, rising racial diversity 
encourages them to develop in-group identity along with out-group hostility and incentivizes 
them to think and act collectively with others of the same race. Therefore, racial diversity might 
increase in-group or bonding social capital while out-group or bridging social capital remains 
low (Putnam, 2001, 2007). Therefore, we arrive at a second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Racial diversity increases bonding social capital but decreases bridging social 
capital in U.S. counties. 
 
Third, we advance further predictions on how racial and economic heterogeneity affects 
social capital by considering their interaction effects. We share the view that the impact of racial 
and economic heterogeneity on social capital is complex (Finseraas & Jakobsson, 2012; 
Paarlberg et al., 2018). Therefore, it is important to recognize the multidimensionality of their 
influence on the stock of social capital. Considering this point, we argue that when income 
inequality and racial diversity interact in society, they work as crosscutting cleavages that 
intersect each other, moderating the intensity of one dominant cleavage. This argument is in line 
with the crosscutting cleavages theory (Dahl, 1956; Lipset, 1960; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; 
Powell, 1976). According to this theory, individuals of the same group on one dimension of 
identity such as race or ethnicity, by sharing memberships of different groups on other 
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dimensions such as social class, can dilute their allegiance to the primary identity. Thus, the 
crosscutting cleavages and interests arising thereof can prevent polarization along one primary 
line of cleavage and induce social cohesion. For instance, Dunning and Harrison (2010) confirm 
the theory showing that although ethnic identity is the predominant cleavage in Mali, because of 
the other crosscutting ties, called “cousinage,” the political intensity of ethnic cleavages is mild 
compared to other Sub-Saharan neighbors with similar levels of ethnic fractionalization. 
Similarly, Bossuroy and Selway (2011) find evidence that the salience of caste in India is 
diminished when individuals share religious identities with those from different castes. 
Blau and his colleagues offer in-depth explanations about the mechanism of the 
crosscutting cleavages theory. They argue that crosscutting social circles, defined notably by 
race, nationality, socioeconomic status, and age, for instance, promote intergroup associations 
because multiple intersection of social differences imposes constraints for individuals to stick to 
their predominant in-group tendencies and ignore others (Blau, 1977; Blau et al., 1982, 1984; 
Sampson, 1984). Therefore, in a society with high levels of heterogeneity where multiple salient 
cleavages coexist by definition, individuals are likely to be exposed to out-groups on one 
dimension, but at the same time they are found to be in-groups on other dimensions. These 
intersecting social circles work as a counterforce, mitigating prevailing social cleavages and 
further intergroup relations. 
The insight from the crosscutting cleavages theory provides a new perspective regarding 
the combined effect of income inequality and racial diversity on social capital. The dominant 
view in the literature is that income inequality and racial diversity erode trust and social capital 
and this negative effect gets worse when these two factors coexist. However, we believe that is 
not the case. When combined, they counteract. Given the centrality of race as the dominant 
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cleavage in American politics (Branton & Jones, 2005; Hero & Levy, 2016), income inequality 
is hypothesized to work as a cleavage that crosscuts racial divisions and thereby undercuts the 
salience of race. This, in turn, moderates the negative impact of racial diversity on social capital. 
We further assert that income inequality in its interaction with racial diversity could 
provide a unique opportunity for its residents to develop bridging social capital across racial and 
ethnic groups and increase bonding between those within the similar income groups at the same 
time. In a racially fragmented county, when income inequality rises so severely that it triggers 
common anger and frustration among the members, then they may be incentivized to help each 
other and able to develop a newly defined sense of “we” or bounded solidarity along the income 
dimension. In short, high degrees of income inequality combined with racial diversity can be 
conducive to interracial ties as well as economic bonding. Therefore, this leads us to propose the 
following hypotheses. 
 
H3: The negative effect of racial diversity on social capital formation is diminished as 
income inequality increases. 
 
H4: The combination of high income inequality and racial diversity increases both 
bonding and bridging social capital. 
 
Data and Analysis 
To test the hypotheses discussed above, we collected data about 3,140 U.S. counties in 
2009 and 2014. The dependent variable measures the level of social capital in each county 
following Rupasingha et al. (2006) who measured county-level social capital for both 1990 and 
1997. The social capital index has been updated three more times for 2005, 2009, and 2014. 
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Unfortunately, however, the 1990s’ measures became incomparable with the later index as they 
adopted a different associational typology for the 2000s’ measures. Furthermore, the lack of data 
availability regarding other variables at the county-level limits the temporal scope of our study 
further. This leads us to incorporate only the two most recent waves of social capital data in our 
analysis.4 
The social capital index has four different components. First, the index includes 
associational density measured at the county-level. Ten different types of associations were 
included: civic organizations, bowling centers, golf clubs, fitness centers, sports organizations, 
religious organizations, political organizations, labor organizations, business organizations, and 
professional organizations. All count variables were operationalized as the total number of these 
associations per 1,000 people in each county and added up to make an associational density 
variable. Second, three additional variables were included: (1) the turnout rates for the previous 
presidential election, (2) the response rate to the Census Bureau’s decennial census, and (3) the 
number of non-profit organizations. Finally, the principal component of these four variables was 
extracted and used as an index of social capital. By removing a severe social-capital outlier,5 the 
index varies from - 3.9 to 9.1 across the U.S. counties. To our knowledge, this is one of the most 
comprehensive measures of social capital in the existing literature while most previous research 
focuses on select components of social capital, such as generalized trust, social cohesion, or a 
sense of belonging (e.g., Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2015; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Leigh, 2006; 
 
4 Other country-level variables used in our analysis are provided by the American Community Survey, 
which is available only since 2009. See for a source of county-level social capital data utilized in this 
study, https://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/community/social-capital-resources. Rupasingha, A., Goetz, S. J., and 
Freshwater, D. (2006, with updates), “The Production of Social Capital in U.S. Counties”, Journal of 
Socio-Economics, 35, 83–101. 
5 Edgefield County in South Carolina scores 17.44 in 2009 and 21.8 in 2014 for social capital index. 
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Letki, 2008; Newton, 2001; Phan, 2008; Stolle & Rochon, 1998; Stolle, et al., 2008; Uslaner, 
2004; Uslaner & Brown, 2005). 
In measuring bonding and bridging social capital, we use proxies, named “Putnam-type” 
and “Olson-type” associations borrowing from Knack (2003) and Rupasingha et al. (2006). 
Putnam-type associations create social interactions designed to promote generalized trust, 
solidarity, cooperation, and public-spiritedness, having positive and generalized spillover effects 
in society. Among the 10 association variables mentioned above, the first six variables are coded 
as “Putnam-type” associational density. We use this variable as a proxy for bridging social 
capital. Olson-type associations have the “propensity of associations to act as special interest 
groups that lobby for preferential policies, imposing disproportionate costs on the rest of society” 
(Knack, 2003: 341). Rupasingha et al. (2006) refer to these associations as rent-seeking 
organizations. As the nature of Olson-type associations is proximate to the concept of in-group 
bonding or particularized trust, we use this as a proxy for bonding social capital in our analysis. 
The last four variables of the 10 association variables in our data are coded as “Olson-type” 
associational density (see, Rupasingha et al., 2006). 
Following Alesina et al. (1999), we measure racial diversity with the index of ethnic 
fractionalization. This index measures the probability that two randomly chosen people in a 
county are from different ethnic groups. We can calculate this index as one minus the sum of the 
squares of the proportion of each race relative to the population of the county. Using seven 
categories of racial groups,6 our racial/ethnic diversity index varies from 0 to .77. A higher value 
indicates a higher level of racial/ethnic diversity. To measure the level of inequality, we adopt 
 
6 The seven categories include non-Hispanic White, Hispanic, Black, American Indians, Asian, Pacific 
Islander, and others. 
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the Gini index, which is the most popular measure of income inequality. 0 means the perfectly 
equal distribution of wealth while 1 signifies maximum inequality where one person owns 
everything in a county. The county-level Gini coefficients, provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, 
ranges from .21 to .65. 
 Some important control variables are also included in our analysis. First, we include 
variables to control for the degree of urbanization. It is conventional wisdom that metropolitan 
areas are unfavorable for the growth of social capital (Fairbrother & Martin, 2013; Rupasingha et 
al., 2006). Following the Rural-Urban Continuum Codes defined by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, we create two dummy variables for metro (originally coded as 1, 2, and 3) counties 
and rural (originally coded as 7 and 9) counties each with an urban population less than 20,000 
and not adjacent to a metro area. By using suburban counties (originally coded as 4, 5, 6, and 8) 
as a reference category,7 we expect the metro area variable to have a negative effect on social 
capital while the rural area variable has a positive effect. Relatedly, one might consider 
controlling for the size of county population. However, as it highly correlates with the 
urbanization variable, we decide not to include it in our model. The replacement of urbanization 
with county population in our analysis does not change results. 
Second, we also control for income and education of counties. For measuring the county-
level income, we employ the natural logarithm of average household income. Educational 
attainment is measured by the proportion of individuals who have at least some college education 
per county. In our sample, the education variable varies from 0.18 to .89. Although both 
education and income are expected to have a positive influence on social capital, we cannot 
 




estimate their effects simultaneously as their correlation is about .71 in our data. Therefore, we 
run separate models using education and income. 
 Third, it is necessary to consider the movement of people. Undoubtedly, interpersonal 
relationships, associational life, and civic or communal engagement should be negatively 
affected by heavy flows of people coming and leaving. Utilizing the American Community 
Survey data set provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, we measure the percentage non-migratory 
population in each county over the two periods. The non-mover rates range between 0.48 and 
0.99. As the variable is a proxy for the residential attachment to the community, it is expected to 
have a positive impact on our dependent variable. Fourth, we include female labor market 
participation rates. Its theoretical expectation is ambiguous. On the one hand, we believe its 
effect might be negative as the traditional role of women in social capital formation at the 
neighborhood level decreases simply because women no longer stay home. On the other hand, 
women’s active participation in the labor market might vitalize their associational life and form 
social capital in their workplace. Thus, instead of making a particular prediction regarding its 
effect, we leave it open until we discuss our findings from the empirical analysis. Lastly, 
following Rupasingha et al. (2006), we also include the proportion of family households out of 
entire households in each county. Based on Rupasingha et al. (2006), this variable is expected to 
have a positive effect on social capital. 
In order to test the hypotheses proposed in this article rigorously, we employ a 
multivariate regression estimation for the cross-sectional analysis of social capital given that the 
dependent variable is continuous, and the number of observations is large enough. However, 
since a simple structure of an error term in the multivariate regression analysis might not be able 
to capture the multifaceted structure of social capital, we adopt a multilevel modeling (MLM) 
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approach to address this concern. Above all, MLM can account for the variation of social capital 
across the states in our estimation as 3,140 counties are exclusively clustered into 50 states. 
Ignoring this multilevel structure of the data set would be a serious violation of regression 
assumptions and would lead to incorrect standard errors (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Snijders & 
Bosker, 2011; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). We directly deal with this issue by estimating this 
multilevel structure of error terms with MLM.8 Since our analysis includes two time points, we 
include a year fixed effect for 2014. 
Social Capital ij = γ00 + γ10 Diversity ij + γ20 Inequality ij + γ30 Urban ij + γ40 Rural ij  
    + γ50 Income ij + γ60 Non-migration ijk  + γ70 Female-workforce + γ80 Family-household ij 
 + γ90 Diversity × Inequality ij + γ100 Year2014 ij + r0j                                                      
, where the individual county is denoted i in each state j and two separate error terms contained 
for both county (γ00) and state (r0j). 
 
Results 
The results are presented in Table 1. According to Model 1, conforming to the 
conventional wisdom, racial diversity reduces social capital as its coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at .01 level. To one’s surprise, however, income inequality turns out to 
have a positive effect on the amount of social capital in the U.S. counties. This finding is in stark 
contrast to the prevailing argument in the literature. Admittedly, it is difficult to understand this 
 
8 As all variables are measured at the county level, one might see that a regression analysis with state 
fixed effects is a more straightforward option. Theoretically, this method is identical to the MLM with a 
random intercept model adopted in this paper. However, we believe the MLM with a random intercept is 
a more rigorous empirical technique that controls for the variations of the dependent variable across the 
states. As we can see in Table A.2 in the appendix, the regression coefficients are slightly different from 




surprising positive relationship between income inequality and social capital. Perhaps, we can 
find a clue from Solt (2011) that asserts economic inequality drives a society to adopt various 
ideological tools such as the “American dream” and diversionary nationalism to maintain the 
legitimacy of the existing socioeconomic and political structure. Based on his view, solidarity 
can be boosted in society albeit artificially as income inequality gets intensified. 
 
Table 1. The Effect of Racial and Economic Heterogeneity on Social Capital: MLM results 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Racial diversity -1.618*** -6.160*** 
 (0.098) (0.782) 
Economic inequality 2.163*** -1.048 
 (0.419) (0.689) 
Urban  -0.438*** -0.439*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Rural 0.524*** 0.534*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Income 0.657*** 0.655*** 
 (0.091) (0.091) 
Non-migration 3.249*** 3.039*** 
 (0.272) (0.274) 
Female workforce  3.987*** 3.863*** 
 (0.242) (0.243) 
Family household -1.700*** -1.493*** 
 (0.275) (0.276) 
Year 2014 -0.076*** -0.066*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Diversity × Inequality  10.383*** 
  (1.773) 
Constant -12.365*** -10.805*** 
 (0.871) (0.909) 
   
Number of counties 6,233 6,233 
Number of states 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Model 2 specifies the interaction between racial diversity and economic inequality. The 
results provide some interesting findings. First, its baseline term (negative at .01 level) suggests 
when a county is perfectly egalitarian (Gini index = 0), racial diversity works negatively for the 
formation of social capital. Second, however, the base term of economic inequality does not 
reach the statistical significance at the conventional level. In other words, when a county is 
perfectly racially homogeneous (Diversity index= 0), we cannot confidently say that inequality 
reduces the amount of social capital. At the same time, its standardized coefficient presented in 
Table A.2 is much weaker than the base term of diversity. In sum, the findings from Model 1 and 
Model 2 provide partial evidence for Hypothesis 1. In racially homogenous counties, the effect 
of income inequality is found to be almost nonexistent. 
More interestingly, the interaction term suggests that racially diverse counties create 
more social capital as they become more economically unequal. Put differently, the negative 
effect of racial diversity on social capital is offset by economic inequality, confirming 
Hypothesis 3. The results are robust either by substituting the diversity index with the minority 
group size (Table A.3) or controlling for the minority group size (Table A.4). All results are 
shown in the Appendix. This finding provides a new perspective contrary to the existing 
literature, which assumes both racial and economic heterogeneity negatively affects social capital 
and these two factors combined should further reduce social capital. Our finding suggests that 
the working of racial diversity and income inequality is more complex than commonly assumed. 
As the interpretation of the multiplicative interaction term should be handled carefully, we 
scrutinize the conditional relationship between these variables more closely (Brambor et al., 




Figure 1. The Interaction between Inequality & Diversity: the Marginal Effects 
  
(a)  (b)  
 
Figure 1 displays the marginal effects of both racial diversity and inequality on the 
formation of social capital. We also visualized the interactions with the predicted values of social 
capital and presented in the Appendix. By taking the partial derivative of the equation with 
respect to the independent variable of interest, Figure 1 presents how the marginal effects change 
as the moderating variable changes its value from the minimum to the maximum. In support of 
the discussion above, Figure 1(a) shows that in a county with a homogenous distribution of 
income, the effect of racial diversity on social capital is negative and  statistically significant. As 
the distribution of income gets more and more unequal, the negative effect of racial diversity 
becomes effectively mitigated, but its effect becomes statistically insigificant beyond ineqaulity 
value of .55. Hypothesis 3 receives strong support. The other side of the story is also interesting 
as is shown in Figure 1(b). The social-capital-creating effect of income inequality is magnified if 
counties get more and more heterogeneous racially. When a community is racially homogenous, 
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increases beyond .2, however, the effect of income inequality becomes positive and statistically 
significant. 
The results concerning control variables generally reaffirm conventional wisdom. First, 
urbanization reduces social capital. As the coefficients suggest, compared to the suburban 
counties, urban counties tend to have less social capital while rural counties have more. Second, 
following the conventional wisdom, we can see that a higher level of income is associated with a 
higher level of social capital. We also estimate the effect of education, the percentage of 
individuals with some college education and more, and the results remain the same as income. At 
the same time, as expected, a higher level of the non-migratory population also has a positive and 
statistically significant influence on the production of social capital. Third, our analysis shows 
that female participation in the labor market works positively instead of negatively for the 
growth of social capital. It suggests the opportunities to form networks and increased 
interpersonal engagement provided in the workplace outweigh those available to housewives. 
Lastly, however, we can see that the proportion of family households has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient suggesting that family-oriented counties are associated with 
lower levels of social capital with all else equal. This result can be explained by Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2000) that child-rearing activities take away opportunities for parents to enjoy 




Table 2. Putnam-type vs. Olson-type Associations 
 Putnam-type (Bridging) Olson-type (Bonding) 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
     
Racial diversity -0.530*** -1.528*** -0.072*** 0.113 
 (0.057) (0.457) (0.015) (0.126) 
Economic inequality 1.769*** 1.064*** -0.066 0.065 
 (0.244) (0.403) (0.067) (0.111) 
Urban  -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) 
Rural 0.203*** 0.205*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) 
Income -0.267*** -0.267*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.014) (0.014) 
Non-migration 0.766*** 0.720*** -0.009 -0.000 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.044) (0.044) 
Female workforce  2.174*** 2.147*** 0.107*** 0.113*** 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.038) (0.038) 
Family household 0.506*** 0.552*** -0.553*** -0.561*** 
 (0.160) (0.161) (0.044) (0.044) 
Year 2014 0.013 0.015 -0.026*** -0.027*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) 
Diversity × Inequality  2.281**  -0.424 
  (1.035)  (0.286) 
Constant 1.043** 1.385*** -1.201*** -1.264*** 
 (0.506) (0.529) (0.137) (0.143) 
     
Number of counties 6,233 6,233 6,233 6,233 
Number of states 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We further investigate how these same factors are associated with different types of 
social capital, namely bonding versus bridging social capital, measured by proxies as Olson-type 
and Putnam-type associational density, respectively. Table 2 provides the results. Several 
interesting conclusions can be drawn from the table. First, it shows that racial diversity has 
consistently negative effects on two different types of social capital: as racial diversity increases, 
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the density of Putnam-type organizations as well as Olson-type organizations decreases. 
However, its negative effect is stronger on Putnam type associations than on Olson type 
associations. Of course, the comparison of coefficients across models requires a cautious 
interpretation as the scale of measurement affects the magnitude of coefficients in each model. 
We address this issue by standardizing the dependent variables. The re-estimation leads us to the 
same conclusion (see the Appendix Table A.6). Thus, unlike Hypothesis 2, we find that racial 
diversity does reduce both bonding and bridging social capital although it impacts bridging 
social capital more adversely than bonding social capital. 
Second, according to Models 3 and 5, the positive effect of economic inequality on social 
capital is largely driven by its effect on bridging social capital. The coefficient of income 
inequality is positive and statistically significant at a 0.01 level for bridging social capital 
(Putnam-type) while it fails to reach any statistical significance for bonding social capital 
(Olson-type). We can argue that economic inequality in the county context encourages residents 
to engage with others who are from diverse backgrounds while it does not necessarily induce 
bonding among individuals who are alike. In Model 4 and Model 6, we can also see that the 
positive conditional effect of inequality is largely driven by its positive effect on bridging social 
capital.  
The results for the control variables also provide interesting insights. First, regardless of 
the types of social capital, the three control variables have the same and consistent effects as seen 
across Models 3 through 6. Urbanization unfailingly reduces bonding and bridging social capital 
whereas both rural residence and female participation in the workforce add more to both. 
Second, the effect of income is negative on Putnam-type associational density while positive on 
the Olson-type. In other words, higher income suppresses bridging associations, but increases 
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bonding associations. Lastly, non-migratory population increases Putnam-type or bridging social 
capital while having no discernable effects on Olson-type or bonding social capital. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we examine how the interplay between racial diversity and economic 
inequality affects the wealth of social capital across the U.S. counties. The multilevel regression 
analysis of 3,140 U.S. counties provides some interesting findings. First, racial diversity and 
economic inequality have a differential impact on social capital. In compliance with the findings 
from previous research, our analysis suggests that racial diversity is the most crucial factor that 
diminishes social capital in American society. Surprisingly, however, economic inequality is 
found to contribute to producing social capital. Its positive impact is found consistently across 
the models with various specifications. Furthermore, racial diversity proves to be a social-
capital-inhibitor not only of bridging, but also of bonding type while income inequality increases 
bridging social capital without any comparable impact on bonding social capital. This finding 
confirms Putnam’s (2007) view that both types of social capital are not necessarily inversely 
associated. Instead, it is more accurate to consider them to have synergetic relationships. 
Second, as predicted, when economic inequality interacts with racial diversity, it 
counteracts the social-capital-reducing effect of racial diversity. As the crosscutting cleavages 
theory suggests, in racially fragmented counties, economic inequality works as a competing 
cleavage that crosscuts the racial cleavage and thereby mitigates the salience of racial division. 
As a result, increased economic inequality ironically contributes to producing bridging 
(interracial) as well as bonding (income-based) social capital. To our knowledge, Paarlberg et al. 
(2018) is the only study that explores the interaction effect between racial diversity and income 
inequality besides ours, whose finding is similar to ours. However, the authors do not provide a 
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theoretical explanation concerning this unconventional and mysterious positive conditioning 
effect of income inequality on racial diversity in their impact upon social capital. By paying 
attention to the multidimensionality of racial and economic heterogeneity, our study provides 
more nuanced arguments about their effects on social capital than the existing literature. 
The findings of this article offer important implications in understanding inequality and 
American democracy. First, they pose a question how to reconcile with the widely accepted view 
that income inequality depresses political engagement in the U.S. (Ritter & Solt, 2017; Solt, 
2010; Soss & Jacobs, 2009). Given that social capital and political engagement—usually 
measured as electoral participation—are closely related to each other, it is necessary to explain 
why our findings do not quite square with what previous research demonstrates. There are a few 
possibilities that might explain this discrepancy. Firstly, it could mean that the effect of income 
inequality in counties might be different from that in macro contexts such as states and the entire 
nation. Previous studies found the negative inequality-engagement relationship at the state level. 
Secondly, it also could be explained by the potential difference between self-reported and actual 
participation and engagement. Most scholars measured electoral participation using individual-
level surveys whereas we employ the social capital index constructed based on actual county-
level voter turnout and associational density. 
Second, this article suggests a possibility that there might be some disparities between 
perceived and actual income inequality. If the disparities are not negligible, then it becomes 
crucial that a researcher take that into consideration and investigate separately how perceived 
and actual inequality affects citizens’ engagement. 
Third, as suggested by the crosscutting cleavages theory and pluralism, our results 
propose that the plurality of competing cleavages is better than one dominant rift for democratic 
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governance in America. We do not suggest income inequality is desirable. Rather, we agree that 
the ever increasing income polarization in the U.S. is one of the most serious problems. 
Ironically, however, given the dominance of racial divisions in American politics, the rise of 
income inequality seems to open a new horizon through which more people are motivated to 
bond together and invest in collective activities, which would not be the case otherwise. Put 
differently, faced with multiple strains, Americans likely break their quiescence and act out.   
This study reveals a potential research agenda that is worth further scholarly attention. 
First, it is necessary to reconsider the concepts of bonding and bridging social capital and to 
develop a better measure for these. Some scholars have raised concerns over how social capital is 
currently conceptualized and operationalized in the literature as being racially insensitive, largely 
based on white experience. For instance, Putnam-type social capital is conceptualized as formal 
groups, voluntary civic associations, and community engagement, which is proven to be valid for 
whites and less so for non-white populations in the U.S. (Liu et al., 2009). Many scholars point 
out that for African Americans, for instance, churches serve as the most influential agent to build 
up social capital, contributing to political and civic activism as suggested by the “social capital 
hypothesis” (Alex-Assensoh & Assensoh, 2001; Brown & Brown, 2003; Calhoun-Brown, 1996; 
Farris & Holman, 2014; Harris-Lacewell, 2004; Liu et al., 2009; Mangum, 2011). Harris-
Lacewell (2004) adds barbershops as an important public space where social networks and 
interpersonal relations form among African Americans. Without capturing racial sensitivity in 
operationalizing social capital, we might fall into measuring white social capital, not necessarily 
the overall social capital. 
Second, in order to understand the interaction between racial diversity and income 
inequality in the U.S. context more accurately, it is important to consider the role of residential 
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segregation. Increased racial diversity in a county does not necessarily increase interracial 
associations if racial residential segregation is prevalent in that county. To make things more 
complicated, residential segregation in the U.S. tells us that race and socioeconomic factors 
interact closely in determining the composition of neighborhoods (Brunch, 2014; Reardon et al., 
2015). For this reason, if income inequality correlates with race such that income gaps increase 
between races (whites versus minorities) instead of within races, then the coexistence of racial 
diversity and income inequality does not necessarily increase bridging social capital, as 
suggested by our analysis. On the contrary, their coexistence would mean exacerbated racial 
inequality, reinforcing within-race bonding. Our data shows a relatively low correlation between 
our measures of county-level racial diversity and income inequality (r=.32), which suggests that 
our findings are not significantly driven by segregation. Unfortunately however, our data does 
not allow us to factor segregation into the analysis. For this purpose, we need more nuanced data 
measured at a community- or neighborhood-level. We leave this for our future project.   
Third, further study should be done to fully understand the relationship between 
economic inequality and social capital in U.S. counties and its meaning for American 
democracy. One of the robust findings in our analysis, the social-capital-generating effect of 
economic inequality, has large implications for democracy. There is much evidence that for 
some Americans, economic concerns are secondary compared to concerns related to preserving 
their identities (e.g., white nationalism) or finding others to blame for opportunities they have 
lost. Extant research demonstrates that President Trump was able to benefit from these identity-
related concerns which ultimately united some white voters from different economic 
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Table A.1. Summary Statistics  
Variable  N mean SD Min Max 
Social capital index 6245 -0.007 1.250 -3.925 9.149 
Racial diversity 6245 0.286 0.183 0 0.769 
Inequality 6245 0.436 0.036 0.207 0.652 
Urban 6244 0.372 0.483 0 1 
Rural  6244 0.271 0.444 0 1 
Income 6245 10.942 0.224 10.259 11.934 
Education 6245 0.483 0.109 0.181 0.886 
Non-migration 6234 0.859 0.046 0.478 0.997 
Female workforce 6245 0.701 0.076 0.361 1 
Family household 6245 0.523 0.068 0.233 0.902 
Putnam 6245 1.254 0.653 0 6.887 





Table A.2 The Effect of Diversity and Inequality on Social Capital: OLS 








     
Racial diversity -1.610*** -6.134*** -0.236 -0.899 
 (0.120) (0.984)   
Economic inequality 2.118*** -1.077 0.061 -0.031 
 (0.638) (1.059)   
Urban  -0.435*** -0.437*** -0.169 -0.169 
 (0.027) (0.027)   
Rural 0.521*** 0.530*** 0.185 0.189 
 (0.034) (0.034)   
Income 0.681*** 0.678*** 0.122 0.121 
 (0.115) (0.116)   
Non-migration 3.278*** 3.068*** 0.122 0.114 
 (0.306) (0.315)   
Female workforce  3.865*** 3.743*** 0.234 0.227 
 (0.376) (0.375)   
Family household -1.751*** -1.540*** -0.095 -0.084 
 (0.413) (0.415)   
Year 2014 -0.079*** -0.069*** -0.032 -0.028 
 (0.025) (0.026)   
Diversity × Inequality  10.342***  0.702 
  (2.265)   
Constant -13.360*** -11.703*** - - 
 (1.055) (1.198)   
   
  
State dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,233 6,233 6,233 6,233 
R-squared 0.540 0.543 0.540 0.543 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table A.3 The Effect of Diversity and Inequality on Social Capital: Minority Group Size 
 Model 11 Model 12 
   
Minority group size, % -0.296*** -0.299*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Economic inequality 0.077*** 0.069*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Urban  -0.438*** -0.439*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Rural 0.524*** 0.534*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Income 0.657*** 0.655*** 
 (0.091) (0.091) 
Non-migration 3.249*** 3.039*** 
 (0.272) (0.274) 
Female workforce  3.987*** 3.863*** 
 (0.242) (0.243) 
Family household -1.700*** -1.493*** 
 (0.275) (0.276) 
Year 2014 -0.076*** -0.066*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Minority group size × Inequality  0.068*** 
  (0.012) 
Constant -11.885*** -11.730*** 
 (0.898) (0.896) 
   
Number of counties 6,233 6,233 
Number of states 50 50 
Note: Minority group size is the percentage of minorities in each county (Black, 
Indian, Asian, Hawaiian, and two or more races).; Standard errors in parentheses; 





Table A.4. The Effect of Diversity and Inequality on Social Capital: Minority Group Size 
Control 
 Model 13 Model 14 
   
Racial diversity -1.388*** -6.463*** 
 (0.105) (0.781) 
Economic inequality 2.234*** -1.365** 
 (0.418) (0.689) 
Urban  -0.432*** -0.433*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Rural 0.522*** 0.532*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Income 0.620*** 0.614*** 
 (0.091) (0.090) 
Non-migration 3.407*** 3.190*** 
 (0.273) (0.274) 
Female workforce  4.007*** 3.870*** 
 (0.242) (0.242) 
Family household -1.837*** -1.620*** 
 (0.275) (0.276) 
Minority group size, % -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Year 2014 0.049 0.075** 
 (0.032) (0.032) 
Minority group size × Inequality  11.661*** 
  (1.777) 
Constant -12.129*** -10.349*** 
 (0.870) (0.908) 
   
Observations 6,233 6,233 
Number of groups 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table A.5 The Effect of Diversity and Inequality on Social Capital: Standardization 
 Model 12 Model 13 
   
Racial diversity (z-score) -0.296*** -0.299*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Economic inequality (z-score) 0.077*** 0.069*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Urban  -0.438*** -0.439*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Rural 0.524*** 0.534*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Income 0.657*** 0.655*** 
 (0.091) (0.091) 
Non-migration 3.249*** 3.039*** 
 (0.272) (0.274) 
Female workforce  3.987*** 3.863*** 
 (0.242) (0.243) 
Family household -1.700*** -1.493*** 
 (0.275) (0.276) 
Year 2014 -0.076*** -0.066*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Diversity (z-score) × Inequality (z-score)  0.068*** 
  (0.012) 
Constant -11.885*** -11.730*** 
 (0.898) (0.896) 
   
Number of counties 6,233 6,233 
Number of states 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table A.6 Putnam-type vs. Olson-type Associations: Standardization 




 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
     
Racial diversity -0.530*** -1.528*** -0.072*** 0.113 
 (0.057) (0.457) (0.015) (0.126) 
Economic Inequality 1.769*** 1.064*** -0.066 0.065 
 (0.244) (0.403) (0.067) (0.111) 
Urban  -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) 
Rural  0.203*** 0.205*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) 
Income  -0.267*** -0.267*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.014) (0.014) 
Non-migration 0.766*** 0.720*** -0.009 -0.000 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.044) (0.044) 
Female workforce 2.174*** 2.147*** 0.107*** 0.113*** 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.038) (0.038) 
Family household 0.506*** 0.552*** -0.553*** -0.561*** 
 (0.160) (0.161) (0.044) (0.044) 
Year 2014 0.013 0.015 -0.026*** -0.027*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) 
Diversity × Inequality  2.281**  -0.424 
  (1.035)  (0.286) 
Constant 1.043** 1.385*** -1.201*** -1.264*** 
 (0.506) (0.529) (0.137) (0.143) 
     
Number of counties 6,233 6,233 6,233 6,233 
Number of states 50 50 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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